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Although science, philosophy, literature, and religion each have a different way offormu-
lating explanations, they are all telling stories of why and how. The author describes how the
human propensity to seek explanation through narrative can he understood as the product of
an embodied mind. He offers a hypothesis ( "mythemesis" ) to explain the process and goes on
to show that it may provide an opportunity to reduce scientific-religious conflict by transcend-
ing the dichotomy between first- and third-person modes of experience.
Being alive begs the questions: Why?
How? To a greater or lesser degree each of
us spends a lifetime in search of answers to
these existential queries—and the myriad of
lesser questions they each generate. Vast
populations of people are satisfied by the an-
swers provided in the received knowledge
passed to them by their forebears and cultures.
For others, the search for answers becomes a
much more personal thing. Driven by a para-
doxical combination of hope and skepticism,
they require explanations that carry with them
a certain degree of independent authenticity.
Their hope lies in the very idea that explana-
tions are possible—that the answers lie in the
nature of things. Their skepticism is reserved
for received knowledge itself—the unques-
tioning acceptance of someone else's expla-
nation as "truth." The hopeful skeptic learns
early that the personal search for answers re-
quires humility in the face of almost certain
knowledge that there are no final answers.
Although it seems as if the search leads only
to preliminary answers that continually gen-
erate ever-deeper questions, a sense of won-
der and mystery often accompanies the
searcher. As E. E. Cummings said, "Always
the beautiful answer who asks a more beauti-
ful question."
'
But what fomi does our search for answers
take? What constitutes an "explanation" suf-
ficient to establish the authenticity of a point
of view or an experience? In this paper, I will
attempt to show that our efforts to find an-
swers almost always take the form of narra-
tives. The stories we tell ourselves, and the
degree of resonance they have in our living
experience, seem to provide the most satisfy-
ing answers to the existential questions. This
feeling of "resonance" has been called the
"Aha! experience," an all-encompassing sense
that what one has just heard, read, seen, or
thought carries an aspect of believability that
stands out from the noise of nomial observa-
tion and discourse. It is an embodied phe-
nomenon that involves much more than the
mental exercise of a logical proof or a state-
ment of faith.- Joseph Campbell made an
important observation about "resonance" and
the nature of the existential search:
People say that what we're all seeking
is a meaning for life. I don't think
that's what we're really seeking. I think
that what we're seeking is an experi-
ence of being alive, so that our life
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experiences on the purely physical
plane will have resonances within our
own innermost being and reality, so that
we will actually feel the rapture ot"
being alive. ^
Science, philosophy, literature, and reli-
gion each have a different way of formulating
explanatory narratives but, at the end of the
day, they are all telling stories of why and how.
And they all have the capability of generating
profound "Aha! experiences." Each of us car-
ries in his or her autobiographical memory (in
many forms and on many levels) interlocking
stories that can be brought to awareness in
consciousness where they seem to resonate
with life itself. This propensity to seek ex-
planation through narrative (i.e., "stories")
may be found in all fonns of intellectual pur-
suit and across all modes ofdiscour.se.
What could possibly be the reason for all
forms of human explaining to be based on
something as elementary as story-telling?
Briefly stated: human mental apparatus ap-
pears to be hard-wired for narrative. The in-
teraction of the human brain with the rest of
the world is played out across time in a con-
textual and interactive manner. People don't
just "tell" stories; they are driven by them. I
have more to say below about this.
Meaning itself emerges at a certain
instant during an experience when a
string of mythemesformed over an
interval in time ^freezes^^ into a self-
consistent whole.
I propose the term "mythemesis" to refer
to this fundamental process which may lie at
the core of all systems of human thought.
Claude Levi-Strauss coined the term
"mytheme"—the units common to many
myths of diverse origin—as an iinalogy to what
the linguist Roman Jakobson called "pho-
nemes"—the fundamental units of sounds that
make up words.^ It would seem appropriate
to carry this definition forward for use as a
descriptor for a narrative-based process that
seeks to explain understanding. Furthennore,
the terms mytheme and mythemesis are use-
ful when seen in contrast to currently popular
reductionist tenns meme and memetics which
will be discussed in detail later on.
The mythemetic quest is Hegelian in na-
ture: it seeks an explanation that bridges the
epistemological gap between knowledge and
belief by exploring a deeper reality that lies
at the foundation of both. The sought-after
deeper reality is not just another objective ex-
planation of life and experience; it consists of
nothing less than radically different definitions
of both life and the living experience.
It is important to keep in mind that the
dissection of a narrative entity into its com-
ponent parts cannot lead to a true apprecia-
tion of its explanatory power. Just as the map
is not the territory, the written or verbal nar-
rative does not "come alive" until it passes
through the brain. The "meaning" that one
derives from a narrative fragment results not
from using grammar, syntax, and vocabulary
to manipulate symbols, but from a complex
interplay of the symbols with one's own men-
tal apparatus and unique autobiographical
memory—"the organized record of the main
aspects of an organism's
biography.'"' The myth-
emesis event is both ex-
periential and descrip-
tive, bridging the gap be-
tween first- and third-
person modes of descrip-
tion.
Levi-Strauss ob-
served that myths from
^'^ different cultures carry
certain similarities, regardless of their origin.
Moreover, myths are not only made from lan-
guage—because stories must be "told"—but
also they are a kind of language unto them-
selves.'' Through this language, people at-
tempt to understand the world (and their place
in it) by superimposing dualistic pairings on
phenomena that may, in actuality, be totally
integrated. Levi-Strauss saw the basis of the
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propensity to dichotomize experience in at-
tempting to understand it as a natural prop-
erty of the brain itself. The brain functions in
a binary sort of way. The questions people
ask of the environment are usually in the na-
ture of comparisons; they tend to divide things
in half and then to divide the halves in half,
etc. Levi-Strauss referred to the component
parts that result from this dialectical process
of fragmenting the world as "mythemes." The
telling and retelling of myths is a process of
putting mythemes back together in ever-
changing but ever-related combinations and
forms.^
It is important to realize that Levi-Strauss
does not see the world as binary in nature,
but rather our mental perception of it. This
ingrained tendency mentally to fragment the
"external" world not only impacts our under-
standing of the world but, more importantly,
impacts our definition of "understanding" it-
self. By informing the general Ciutesian no-
tion of separation of mind and matter with its
principle epistemological method, the natu-
ral human propensity to dichotomize gave rise
to reductionism. Most of the great advances
in science since the enlightenment resulted
from the reductive analysis of matter in terms
of the nature and relation of its constituent
parts. However, reductionism has been un-
able to explain first-person experience to a
satisfactory level.
There is a growing consensus among cog-
nitive scientists and philosophers of mind that
the definition of "understanding" must be ex-
panded or changed to accommodate phenom-
enological experience. It is not a Kuhnian sci-
entific "paradigm shift" that seems to be in
order, but rather an epistemological one.** It is
not a new way of looking at things; it is a new
way of looking, one that must somehow in-
coiporate a redefinition of the relationship of
the observer (self) and the observed (things),
such that first-person and third-person views
of reality become mutually comprehensible.
Mythemesis: a new hypothesis
of understanding
Levi-Strauss's concept of the mytheme
offers a good starting point toward the devel-
opment of a non-reductionist approach to the
understanding of living experience and the
processes that give rise to it. Three sequen-
tial steps lead to meaning through the narra-
tive process I have called "mythemesis."
1. Fuzzy representation
Mythemes are the units of intentionality (all
thoughts are about something). They are the
names and labels given to the pieces into
which experience is perceived to be divided.
Each mytheme carries with it a wide variety
of different but occasionally related defini-
tions. Which specific definition is operant at
any given time is determined by the context
in which the mytheme is embedded. It is im-
portant to note that the "fuzziness" of
mythemetic definitions is the primary source
of their utility.
2. Self-organization
A necessary prelude to meaningful experien-
tial events is the non-conscious self-assembling
of mythemes into linear groupings (strings)
over time. These assemblings just "happen"
in our brain/bodies as a natural (evolutionary)
result of our being-in-the-world. They occur
rapidly and in parallel. Most of them do not
reach consciousness. These groupings corre-
spond to what Dennett has called "Multiple
Drafts" in his model of consciousness:
(All) varieties of perception-indeed, all
varieties of thought or mental activity-
are accomplished in the brain by
parallel multilrack processes of
interpretation and elaboration of
sensory inputs. Information entering
the nervous system is under continuous
"editorial control."'
3. Emergence
Meaning itself emerges at a certain instant
during an experience when a string of
mythemes formed over an interval in time
"freezes" into a self-consistent whole. It is
only at this instant that specific definitions of
each and every mytheme in the string are si-
multaneously selected from the wide variety
of potential definitions each could have. The
specific final definition of each mytheme in
the experiential interval is tied by mutual con-
sistency to the specific final definition of ev-
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ery other mytheme in the string. The sudden
and virtually simultaneous establishment of
contextually consistent definitions across the
population of mythemes in the experiential
interval creates a resonance effect that drives
the process to consciousness to become what
we accept as the overall meaning of the expe-
rience."*
Mythemesis differs from reductionist ap-
proaches in that it postulates that meaning
does not result from an analysis of precisely
defined parts and their interactions. On the
contrary, meaning emerges as a self-consis-
tent combination of parts in which the defini-
tion of each part is not precisely determined
until it takes its place in the resonant context
of the selected combination. Reductionism
is a bottom-up, analytical process while
mythemesis is a top-down combinatorial one.
Here is a simple example of how context
and the interplay of mythemes can lead to
three widely different "meanings" (mythemes,
the "fuzzy" variables, are in italics):
The [umheijack. . .honed.. .on the
beam... sailing...
Meaning 1: The lumberjack let his freshly honed
ax fall on the beam and chips went sailing.
Meaning 2: The lumberjack, having honed
his skills, felt on the beam and went sailing.
Meaning 3: The lumberjack honed in on the
beam and located the sailing vessel.
Cognition
The Oxford Companion to the Mind de-
fines cognition as "the use or handling of
knowledge." It also suggests that the word
"cognition" is probably related to "gnomon"—the shadow-casting rod of the sundial,
which measures the heavens from shadows."
Thus, the concept of the brain/mind as an or-
gan of representation is built into the very root
of the tenn that scientists have applied to the
process used to understand our world. Clas-
sical cognitivists (especially computational
cognitivists) stress the necessity of intention-
ality and hypothesize that cognition consists
of symbolic representations in the brain. '-
These representations subsequently drive hu-
man actions in an externally independent
world and, therefore, one needs only study
these symbols and their manipulation to un-
derstand thought.
There is another way of looking at the re-
lation of culture, communication and context
that focuses on process as well as content, and
that does not depend on classical views of
symbolic representation. Humberto Maturana
characterizes "cognition" as follows:
...an effective action, an action that will
enable a living being to continue its
existence in a deTinite environment as it
brings forth its world. Nothing more,
nothing less.'^
The organism is, in fact, embedded in its
world. Even the use of the word "environ-
ment" implies too great a separation between
a given organism and the rest of existence.
This point of view considers language not to
be merely the exchange of symbolic and rep-
resentational "infomiation" between two cog-
nitive entities, but rather consensual interac-
tion (coupling) between the organisms.
In The Embodied Mind, the neuroscien-
tist Francisco Varela and his colleagues re-
emphasize the conviction that cognition is not
the representation of an independently exist-
ing world by a pregiven mind. It is, rather,
"the enactment of a world and a mind on the
basis of a history of the variety of actions that
a being in the world performs." Varela pro-
poses the term "enactive" to refer such a
view.'"*
In a nutshell, the enactive approach con-
sists of two points: (1) perception consists in
perceptually guided action; and (2) cognitive
structures emerge from the recurrent sen-
sorimotor patterns that enable action to be
perceptually guided.'^ In other words, per-
ception is not based on the organism's ability
to fomi and manipulate symbolic representa-
ti(ms of a independent external world, but
rather on the nature of its sensorimotor struc-
ture. The enactive approach seeks to explain
perception by determining the interrelation-
ships between the sensory and motor systems.
These relationships give rise to actions that
allow the organism to make its way (be "per-
ceptually guided") in a world that is depen-
dent on its own perceptual abilities.
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In such an approach, then, perception is
not simply embedded within and
constrained by the surrounding world: it
also contributes to the enactment of this
surrounding world.... [We] must see
the organism and environment as bound
together in reciprocal specification and
selection."^
This view of the organism as an embed-
ded perceiver-actor in a perception-dependent
world is decidedly first-person in nature.
Third-person (reductionist/objectivist) expla-
nations are unable to capture the essence of
experience because, of necessity, they sepa-
rate the experiencer from the experience. This
has been called the "hard problem" in con-
sciousness studies.'^
The concept of cognition as an embodied
phenomenon supports the mythemesis hy-
pothesis of human understanding. The pro-
motion to consciousness of a self-consistent
string of mythemes as an explanation could
be considered to be a form of "enaction."
Understanding is, in effect, perceptually
guided by the possibilities for action in the
world. It is a blending of first and third per-
son in which actions in the mind and in the
world are coupled. In actuality, from an in-
formation perspective, there is no hard bound-
ary between the brain and the rest of the world.
There is no consciousness without the world—even memory is the result of previous mind-
world couplings. There is no world without
consciousness. There is no understanding
without an enactive dynamic coupling be-
tween the two—a coupling so complete as to
make them a unity.
Genes and memes
Darwin's original explication of natural
selection had three principle components:
variation, selection, and heredity. In his
widely-read book The Selfish Gene, Richard
Dawkins presented his view that biological
evolution is best understood as competition
among genes. '^ Essentially he applied
Darwin's model for natural selection directly
to genes themselves—saying that they are
selfish in the sense that their main "purpose"
is to get themselves replicated and passed to
the next generation. Anytime a replicator
makes imperfect copies of itself, only some
of which survive, evolution is inevitable. In
brief, Dawkins feels that the purpose of or-
ganisms is to function as vehicles (sometimes
referred to as "interactors") for the replica-
tion and survival of genes. The selfish gene
model has as many detractors'" as propo-
nents,-" but the important point for this dis-
cussion is that Dawkins has generalized his
hypothesis to include forms of evolution other
than that of living organisms. Most interest-
ing to us is the application of the concept of
the "differential survival of competing
replicators" to the evolution of mind and cul-
ture. At the end of The Selfish Gene, Dawkins
proposed the appearance of a new replicator—a unit of imitation—which he called the
"meme."
We need a name for the new replicator,
a noun that conveys the idea of a unit of
cultural transmission, or a unit of
imitation. "Mimeme" comes from a
suitable Greek root, but I want a
monosyllabic that sounds a bit like
"gene". I hope my classical friends will
forgive mc if I abbreviate mimeme to
meme.-'
Dawkins proposes that, like genes, memes are
replicators passing from the brain of one per-
son to that of another, sometimes stored, in
the interim, in books, films, audio media, or
the like. A meme is any element of culture,
such as words, songs, rituals, beliefs—virtu-
ally anything that can be transmitted through
symbols, images, behaviors, and the like.
Robert Wright recently observed, "The
'meme' meme has manipulated a lot of brains
since Dawkins unleashed it." In other words,
it has attained such widespread recognition
that it is itself an example of a successful
"memetic" replication."
Daniel Dennett is another major supporter
of memetics:
The primary difference between our
species and all the others is our reliance
on cultural transmission of information,
and hence on cultural evolution. The
unit of cultural evolution, Dawkins'
meme, has a powerful and under-
appreciated role to play in our analysis
of the human sphere. -'
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Dennett says that these new replicators,
memes, are roughly complex ideas that are
assembled in distinct memorable units. Some
examples he gives are the following:
arch
wheel
wearing clothes
vendetta
right triangle
alphabet
calculus
chess
perspective drawing
evolution by natural selection
impressionism
"Greenslcevcs"
deconstructionism
Dennett points out that it is difficult to
formulate a science of memes comparable to
a science of organic evolution due to the fact
that the "very creativity and activity of hu-
man minds as temporary homes for memes
seem to guarantee that lines of decent are
hopelessly muddled." -^ He (among others)
is still convinced, however, that a case can be
made for a memetic theory of cultural evolu-
tion analogous to the genetic theory of organic
evolution. In fact, in Dennett's opinion,
memes are just as selfish as genes:
The haven all memes depend on
reaching is the human mind, but a
human mind is itself an artifact created
when memes restructure a human brain
in order to make it a better habitat for
memes.-'
The "second replicator" or meme theory
is consistent with the prevailing cognitive
perspective that permeates much of the cur-
rent literature in mind science. This prevail-
ing paradigm sees the mind as processor and
the individual as a transmitter of symbols.
Although the hard-core functionalist idea of
the brain as a computer and the mind as "soft-
ware" has fallen out of vogue, there is still a
tendency among cognitivists to focus on the
brain's inputs and outputs as if they were
somehow causes instead of the effects.
Mythemes vs memes
One can see the power of mythemesis by
contrasting how it could be used to deal with
a number of issues that have been addressed
by adherents of the memetics approach. Sev-
eral books have appeared recently that are
devoted entirely to the subject of memes. '^
However, Blackmore's Tfie Meme Machine
is the most ambitious in that it proposes that a
"science of memetics" can "explain," among
other equally significant phenomena, the large
size of the human brain, the origins of lan-
guage, sex, altruism, and the appearance of
religions." I hope to show, by close exami-
nation of Blackmore's treatment of these sub-
jects, that an epistemology of mythemesis,
based on emergent properties of whole sys-
tems yields far more intellectually satisfying
explanations than a reductive science of
memetics based on the transmission of infor-
mational "atomic" entities from brain to brain.
Blackmore's science of memetics is based
on the concept of universal Darwinism. Any
process that requires three main features
—
variation, selection, and retention (or hered-
ity)—can be considered to be "Darwinian."
As genes provide the instructions for making
proteins, so memes provide the instructions
for behavior. As the competition among genes
drives the evolution of the biological world,
she argues, so the competition among memes
(stored in brains or elsewhere) drives the evo-
lution of the mind: ". . .they are the very stuff
of our minds. Our memes is who we are." '**
Mythemesis provides an alternate expla-
nation to memetics as the basis of mind and
behavior. The narrative (the story in the mind)
drives behavior using words and phrases.
These units of narrative in the mind do not
have discrete and well-defined meanings (i.e.,
as memes supposedly do). On the contrary,
they are very "fuzzy" in their definition and
symbolic content. They are capable of many
meanings. The narrative "comes together"
the overall meaning emerges in a resonant
fashion—only at the instant when the specific
meanings (symbolic contents) of all words and
phrases in the mythemetic experience are si-
multaneously selected from a wide variety of
potential meanings. Memes don't change
minds. Minds change mythemes. By focus-
ing on the symbolic units of language and
sensory perception, instead of on the embod-
ied and enactive organism undergoing the
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actual experience, the memeticists miss the
most important and fascinating process oc-
curring in the human brain: the continuous
combinatorial synthesis of meaning from a
substrate of myriad possibilities.
Blackmore carries the memetics argument
further by postulating that memes are not only
responsible for the regulation of behavior but
actually are the principle cause of the evolu-
tion of the large brain in humans. Her argu-
ment goes as follows:
The turning point in our evolutionary
development was when wc began to
imitate each other. From this point on a
second replicator, the meme, came into
play. Memes changed the environment
in which genes were selected, and the
direction of change was determined by
the outcome of memetic selection. So
the selection pressures, which produced
the massive increase in brain size, were
initiated and driven by memes.-''
Imitation is postulated to be the basis of
social learning. Since natural selection would
favor those who become socially adept, brain
size in humans increased as more and more
capacity was required for the more and more
complex memes being generated in the com-
The subsequent rift between science and
religion was compounded by the exclusion
offirst-person ^^knowledge^^from the
decidedly third-person methodology of
scientific investigation.
petitive process of social evolution. In a few
million years, not only have the memes
changed out of all recognition but the genes
have been forced into creating brains capable
of spreading them.^"
Three types of imitative selection are sug-
gested as the basis for this meme-driven evo-
lutionary increase in the size of the brain:
1. Selection for imitation. Those skilled
at it will be better suited for survival.
2. Selection for imitating the imitators.
Those who are good at copying the best copi-
ers will not only be more successful them-
selves, but will pass on the imitation-related
genes to their progeny
3. Selection for mating with the imita-
tors. Those who choose good imitators as
mates will fare better than those who don't
and will assist in passing on the appropriate
genes. Sexual selection can be thought of as
a variant of this type. People who are good at
imitating the useful social memes of the time
would be more attractive to those of the op-
posite sex, memetic agility being a sort of
"peacock's tail" of human beings.
But is the reification of words and other
learned snippets of behavior into memes nec-
essary to explain the massive size of the hu-
man brain? Not if the focus is shifted away
from the symbolic entities that are manipu-
lated in human thought and discourse toward
the embodied mind itself. The human brain
functions priinarily in a relational way. Hu-
man beings are embedded in their worlds. The
old assumption that they are independent en-
tities functioning in an "environment" is be-
ing rapidly superceded by the idea that they
are inextricably tied to the world and continu-
ously interacting with it." Therefore the mi-
lieu undergoing
change and selection
must be expanded be-
yond isolated brains
and symbols to in-
clude the organism-
world interaction.
The most effective or-
ganism-world interac-
tit)ns will be favored
by selection forces for
survival. The human beings who are most
successful at interacting with their world will
be preferentially selected for. As the human-
world interactions become more and more
social and concept-driven, those humans with
the brain capacity to combinatorially formu-
late the most effective mythemes will have a
decided advantage. Brain capacity would
grow as the result of the evolution of more
neuronal groups of increasing complexity,
since such capacity and complexity would be
required to accommodate the increasing so-
phistication of the mythemesis process.
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There are three types of mythemetic se-
lection that may be postulated as analogies to
the "imitative" selection types suggested by
Blackmore:
1. Selection for mythemesis itself. The
large volume of the human brain compared
to other primates is due almost entirely to the
expansion of the cortex, which contains all
the regions of the brain responsible for higher
cognitive abilities. The ability to carry in
memory a large number of "fuzzy" descrip-
tors and, more importantly, the ability to bring
them into coherence upon the self-assembly
of the mytheme are important survival skills.
These skills require large numbers of neurons
in certain cortical aieas of the brain, along with
a plethora of connections between them.
2. Selection for learning mythemesis. It
has been shown that learning, memory and
other cognitive abilities
are functions of the
strength and number of
synapses between neu-
rons." An individual
with a marginally higher
capacity for generating
mythemetic experiences
(i.e., possessing more ef-
fective neuronal configu-
rations and connections)
will have a marginally
better chance of survival and, thus, of passing
his/her genes on to the next generation.
3. Selection for muting with successful
practitioners of mythemesis. An individual
who consistently exhibits the ability to make
sense of the world through an extraordinary
ability to fonnulate mythemetic "stories" use-
ful for survival would certainly be more at-
tractive as a mate than one whose stories were
simplistic and useless. Thus, from a
mythemesis point of view, tiie "peacock's tail"
of human beings is the exhibition of creativ-
ity and understanding, not just being a good
copycat.
Blackmore also contends that memes are
responsible for the evolution of language.
Once imitation evolved, something like
two and a half million years ago, a
second replicator, the meme was born.
As people began to copy each other the
highest-quality memes did the best -
that is those with high fidelity, fecun-
dity, and longevity. A spoken grammati-
cal language resulted from the success
of copyable sounds that were high in all
three. The early speakers of this
language not only copied the best
speakers in their society but also mated
with them, creating natural selection
pressures on the genes to produce brains
that were better and better at spreading
the new memes. In this way the memes
and genes coevolved to produce just one
species with the extraordinary properties
of a large brain and language. The only
essential step to starting this process
was the beginning of imitation. The
general principles of evolution are
enough to account for the rest.^'
She builds her argument for meme-driven
evolution of language on her arguments for
meme-driven regulation of behavior and brain
There are strong reasons to believe that,
even now, mythemetic self-organization
and emergence is proceeding along the
next tier up on the complexity ladder. It
probably includes us, our mental machi-
nations, and our behavior as component
^f^uzzy variables."
growth. An alternative explanation—that lan-
guage is an emergent phenomenon, driven by
the human need for understanding through
narrative in the context of the organism-world
interaction—may be built on the mythemetic
arguments for these two phenomena that were
offered above. If the organism-world inter-
action is viewed as the prime substrate upon
which evolutionary forces operate, then the
brain may be seen as an interface between the
world and the behaving organism. Once the
brain developed to a point where it had suffi-
cient memory and comparative facility to re-
member a past and visualize a future, it would
then have acquired the capacities to concep-
tualize the human-world interaction
mythemetically, as stories. Language may
have developed to accelerate the reinforce-
ment of stable human-world interactions via
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mythemetic representation. The advent of
"copyable sounds" was certainly a necessary
precursor to language, but their emergence
did not drive the development of language.
Rather it provided the raw material for the
fuzzy symbolism required by an organism
that had developed an extraordinary survival
mechanism—the ability to "couple" with its
world through the felt resonance of the nar-
rative.
The selfishness of genes recon-
sidered
It is interesting to note that the
memeticists, in defining the meme as a "sec-
ond replicator" (the gene being the first
replicator), have made use of a nanative tool:
analogy. What if one were to take the
mythemesis hypothesis and apply it by anal-
ogy (in the opposite direction), to evolution?
Perhaps evolution itself is a complex, self-
generative process that is driven primarily
by optimization of the contextual resonance
of the continuously emerging "types" of liv-
ing beings that make up a given (complex)
ecological system. In other words, species
become the genetic analogue to mythemes.
Genes would retain their role as the carriers
of the recipe for construction and mainte-
nance of the individuals of a given species,
but they would be far less important as de-
terminants of the state of the ecological sys-
tem. With the exception of clones and iden-
tical twins, the genetic make-up of an indi-
vidual of a species differs from that of every
other member of the species. Also, the over-
all composition of the gene pool of a spe-
cies at any point in time differs from its com-
position at any other point in time. This di-
versity (analogous to the "fuzziness" of
mythemes) in the individual and species
genotypes is enhanced by mutation and by
recombination (in species that reproduce
sexually). This diversity of individual geno-
types provides the necessary raw material
for the ecological system as a whole to draw
from. Selection, in this view of life, acquires
a whole new meaning. The old Darwinian
"survival" principle is not applicable be-
cause, from a system-wide perspective, the
local behavior of individual members of in-
dividual species making up the ecological
whole is only important in the context of the
behavior of every other species in the sys-
tem. Moreover this context is continuously
changing as new generations of all the spe-
cies replace the old. When evolution is
viewed as a combinatorial phenomenon, and
species as highly interactive components in
a dynamic complex system, selection must
be redefined as an emergent system-wide
property. Species do not individually
"adapt" to "environments"; rather their be-
havior continuously changes (reflected in
continuous changes in the gene pools) in the
context of the resonant interaction of all the
species in the ecosystem. If, ultimately, a
species becomes extinct, it is not because it
is ill adapted but because it. in effect, has
become less meaningful in the context of the
emerging relationships of the evolving eco-
logical system.
The genetic makeup of a species, of
course, sets the boundaries within which be-
havioral change must be contained. But the
combinatorial possibilities that exist in a di-
verse ecosystem, even with a relatively nar-
row range of genotypic diversity within each
species are countless. Nothing is "selfish" in
this approach, especially genes. The variabil-
ity ("fuzziness") in each genotype, in fact,
makes possible the optimization (resonance)
and survival of the overall ecosystem.
Stephen Jay Gould and other critics of the
selfish gene argument have expressed simi-
lar views. ^^
Metamythemesis: The emergence
of a "higher power"
The natural philosophers of the early Eu-
ropean Renaissance sought understanding
from two sources: the Holy Scriptures and the
"book of nature." They believed that God
began to tell the story of existence in what
became the canonical books of the Bible, and
then continued to reveal divine truth through
creation in the world. This dual revelatory
narrative provided a framework for the com-
patible coexistence of belief and empirically
derived knowledge. The subsequent rift be-
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tween science and religion resulted from an
ever-increasing number of perceived incon-
sistencies between the scriptural narrative
and empirical observation of the workings
of the universe. This rift was compounded
by the exclusion of first -person "knowledge"
from the decidedly third-person methodol-
ogy of scientific investigation. Could
mythemesis provide a new narrative form
capable of bridging the gap between science
and religion?
The French philosopher Paul Ricouer
traces the power of the religious experience
to the language of religion. He says that a
religious faith may be identified through its
language, that it consists of a kind of dis-
Ifwe assume that evolvingy self-organizing
systems at higher levels of complexity—
building on life and thought—are truly
passing beyond our ability to grasp them^
then a new story is being told. It is a story
being written by the universe, a third dis-
course beyond theology and science that
transcends both.
course. It has something special to say that is
not said by other types of discourse—ordi-
nary, scientific, poetic. Most significantly, re-
ligious language implies a type of philosophy
because it is a discourse that claims to express
truth.
finds themselves in what Ricouer calls the
world of the text, in which, unlike normal
discourse, the primary reference to things or
persons in the "real" world is subordinated
to a sense of meaning that resonates with the
reader.
Reader find themselves or what they want
for themselves from a certain "understanding"
of the text. So, in an analogous fashion, just
as meaning emerges from the context of words
in a sentence and as species emerge from the
context of the components of a biosphere, be-
lief emerges from the context of the sacred
stories. Ricouer says that being-in-the-world
unfolds "in front of the text." Building on
Heidegger's suggestion of the meaning of
ll Verstehen (understand-
ing) and Befindlichkeit
(state of mind), he sug-
gests that the moment
of understanding (the
"Aha! experience," or
epiphany) comes when
s(Miieone responds dia-
lectically to being in a
situation in which
one's "own-most" pos-
sibilities are projected
in situations in which
we find ourselves.^''
It seems that mythemesis underlies faith
itself. Faith corresponds to finding oneself
and discovering one's unique (ownmost) pos-
sibilities in the context of a sacred story.
A hermeneutic philosophy... will try to
get as close as possible to the most
originary expressions of a community
of faith, to those expressions through
which the members of the community
have interpreted their experience for
the sake of themselves or for others'
sake.^^
In other words, what is important to deter-
mine is not some absolute meaning based
on a set of assumptions but rather to allow
the meaning (as it is experienced by the au-
dience members themselves) to emerge from
the discourse itself. Readers or listeners
(F]aith never appears as an immediate
experience but always as mediated by a
certain language that articulates it. For
my part I should link the concept of
faith to that of self-understanding in the
face of the text. Faith is the attitude of
one who accepts being interpreted at the
same time that he or she interprets the
word of the text. "
All of this leads to the conclusion that
metaphor is not just a literary form that lends
itself to interesting comparisons regarding
mind, life, and faith. It is actually the episte-
mological linchpin that underlies the struc-
tures of and the relationships between these
three basic realms of human existence. In all
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of these spheres of experience, we have ar-
rived in the middle of the story. Classical con-
cepts of causation and atomistic reductionism
do not provide sufficient understanding for a
person to function, with confidence, in the dy-
namic complexity of day-to-day existence.
Each person must seek understanding in the
interplay of relationship and history. To reach
ongoing understanding, particularly at the
pragmatic level, contextual stories must be
continually fomiulated, from which emerge
—
usually metaphorically—the resonant combi-
nations of mythemes that give meaning to
experience.
The level of organization at which we find
ourselves to have emerged in the universe
need not—indeed, probably cannot—be the
final tier. We are only a chapter in a story of
life in a text that the universe continues to
write in time. The process of self-organiza-
tion, even as it is currently only partially un-
derstood, is known to be relentlessly forward-
biased and creatively combinatorial. There
are strong reasons to believe that, even now,
mythemetic self-erganization and emergence
is proceeding along the next tier up on the
complexity ladder. It probably includes us,
our mental machinations, and our behavior as
component "fuzzy variables.'" We have little
or no control over this "meta-mythemesis"
process and may not even have the ability to
fully conceptualize it. However, we need only
look around us to see indications that higher
level self-assembly is underway. Genetic en-
gineering, robotics, artificial intelligence, the
internet, and the globalization of the economy
are only a few of the dynamic, complex inter-
active systems that are generating new com-
binatorial possibilities. Our present confusion
about if, when, and how we should attempt to
regulate these systems underscores our inabil-
ity effectively to understand a higher level of
emerging self-organization that we neither
designed nor predicted.
Most likely, new interacting systems of
"metamythemes" with complexity beyond our
understanding and with organizational struc-
tures that combine information, tlowing elec-
trons, organic systems (including human
brains), and unique energy exchange pro-
cesses, already exist in ways that cannot be
grasped by creatures on a lower plane of ex-
istence. Such interacting systems are prob-
ably transparent to us because we are merely
subsystems in the emergent superorganism.
Molecules have emerged from the interactions
of atoms, cellular life has emerged from the
interaction of molecules, and consciousness
has emerged from the interaction of cells with
each other and the rest of the world. What
happens now?
The only prediction that can be safely made
is that when the future becomes the present, it
will not have been predicted. This will hold
true, whether one is talking about the economy,
the environment or geopolitics. The complex-
ity of the relationships in each of these areas is
usually cited as the reason for our inability to
foresee economic downturns, environmental
catastrophes, or the outbreak of hostilities due
to ethnic and cultural contlicts. But what we
have learned about the nature of complex in-
teractive systems, i.e., that they have a tendency
toward combinatorial self-organization, should
lead us to take the analysis further. The rise of
unpredictable and (to us) catastrophic events
in the world may not be due primarily to com-
plexity and deterioration of order in world-
wide economic, ecological, nor social mecha-
nisms. Paradoxically, they may be byproducts
of a process analogous to mythemesis—an
emerging higher level of order arising from the
genesis of new superorganisms whose func-
tioning tlirough time leave such occurrences
in their wakes. If this is true, Yeats's poem,
"The Second Coming," takes on an ominous
new meaning.
Turning and turning on the widening gyre,
The falcon cannot bear the falconer;
Things fall apart: the center cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world.
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and
everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the
worst
Are full of passionate intensity.
Surely some revelation is at hand;
Surely the Second Coming is at hand.
The Second Coming! Hardly arc those
words out
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When a vast image out of Spiritiis Mumli
Troubles my sight: Somewhere in the
sands of the desert
A shape with a lion body and the head
of a man,
A gaze blank and pitiless as the sun,
Is moving its slow thighs, while all
about it
Reel shadows of the indignant desert birds.
The darkness drops again, but now I
know
That twenty centuries of stony sleep
Were vexed to nightmare by a rocking
cradle.
And what rough beast, its hour come
round at last.
Slouches toward Bethlehem to be
born? - **
What rough beast, indeed! How can we
begin to approach any degree of understand-
ing of the "vast image out ot'Spiritus MuiuHT
If we assume that evolving, self-organizing
systems at higher levels of complexity
—
building on life and thought—are truly pass-
ing beyond our ability to grasp them (at least
in a reductionist fashion), then a new story is
being told. It is a story being written by the
universe, a third discourse beyond theology
and science that transcends both. It is the story
of an emerging "higher power." Although we
are not the authors of the story, we are the
prime source of its component mythemes.
The beast will be autonomous but its nature
will be determined in large pai1 by what we
supply to the combinatorial processes from
which it is emerging. The character of the
beast will reflect our character and that of our
social, economic and political processes. The
quality of our lives will not be determined
directly by our desires but rather by our ac-
tions, and by how those actions resonate in
the living narrative of the emerging "higher
power." We will reap what we sow.^''
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